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2014 / The Changing Face of Espionage
“I urge you to enact [espionage] laws at the earliest possible moment
and feel that in doing so I am urging you to do nothing less than save the
honor and self-respect of the nation. Such creatures of passion,
disloyalty, and anarchy must be crushed out.”
1
—President Woodrow Wilson
I. INTRODUCTION
In May 2013, The Guardian published a series of stories detailing Top Secret
2
United States surveillance programs. A week later, Edward Snowden, a former
government contractor for the National Security Agency (NSA), revealed to the
3
world that he was the source. Upon this disclosure, he sought asylum abroad for
4
his actions, and for good reason. Less than a month later, he was formally
5
6
charged with two counts under the Espionage Act of 1917, among other crimes.
The charges came only a month before the conviction of former United States
Army private Bradley Manning, who was found guilty on six counts under the
Espionage Act for providing thousands of classified military-related documents
7
and videos to Wikileaks for publication.
The United States Government’s use of the Espionage Act to condemn
8
Snowden’s and Manning’s actions has called into question the adequacy of the

* J.D. Candidate, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, 2015; B.A., University of Nevada,
Reno, 2008. I would like to thank Professor John Sims for his invaluable guidance and assistance in writing this
Comment. I would also like to thank the McGeorge Law Review editors and my family and friends for their
incredible support.
1. THIRD ANNUAL MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT WILSON TO CONGRESS, Dec. 7, 1915, in 53 CONG. REC.
99 (1915) [hereinafter THIRD ANNUAL MESSAGE].
2. Glenn Greenwald et al., Edward Snowden: The Whistleblower Behind the NSA Surveillance
Revelations, THE GUARDIAN (June 9, 2013), www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/09/edward-snowden-nsawhistleblower-surveillance (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
3. Id.
4. Peter Baker & Ellen Barry, Snowden, in Russia, Seeks Asylum in Ecuador, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2013),
www.nytimes.com/2013/06/24/world/asia/nsa-leaker-leaves-hong-kong-local-officialssay.html?pagewanted=all (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
5. 18 U.S.C. §§ 792–798 (2012).
6. Criminal Complaint, United States v. Snowden, No. 1:13 CR 265 (E.D.Va. June 14, 2013) (charging
Snowden under sections 793(d) and 798(a)(3) of the Espionage Act and a charge for theft of government
property under 18 U.S.C. § 641).
7. Charlie Savage, Manning is Acquitted of Aiding the Enemy, N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 2013),
www.nytimes.com/2013/07/31/us/bradley-manning-verdict.html?pagewanted%253Dall (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (noting that the military court found Manning guilty on six counts in violation of the
Espionage Act, but found him not guilty on the charge of “aiding the enemy” under Article 104 of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice). Bradley Manning is now called Chelsea Manning after announcing that he identifies
himself as female shortly after his conviction. Michael Pearson, Bradley Manning Wants to Live as a Woman,
be Known as Chelsea, CNN (Aug. 23, 2013, 6:45 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/22/us/bradley-manning
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review). This Comment uses the name Bradley Manning as he was known
during the time the events addressed transpired.
8. Lincoln Caplan, Leaks and Consequences, AM. SCHOLAR, Autumn 2013, available at http://the
americanscholar.org/leaks-and-consequences/#.UknLcoakpHQ/utm_source=pbkemail (on file with the
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9

antique statute. Neither the 64th or the 65th Congress specifically contemplated
modern disclosures of protected information that could fall within the provisions
10
of the Espionage Act, such as improper whistleblowing and other unauthorized
11
leaks. Rather, Congress intended the Act to solve grave wartime concerns, like
12
spying and disloyal conduct, that disrupted military efforts. Notwithstanding
13
various criticisms and a few early amendments, the Espionage Act remains
14
staunchly similar to the original language of 1917.
While the Espionage Act endures, scholars, judges, and government officials
15
have criticized the statute for its ambiguity and overbreadth. These concerns
have led to increased scrutiny of the Espionage Act, especially in the wake of
Snowden’s public disclosure of Top Secret government surveillance programs

McGeorge Law Review).
9. Elizabeth Goitein, Our Antiquated Laws Can’t Cope with National Security Leaks, TIME (June 12,
2013), https:// ideas.time.com/2013/06/12/our-antiquated-laws-cant-cope-with-national-security-leaks (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review).
10. A whistleblower is generally defined as “[a]n employee who reports employer wrong doing to a
governmental or law-enforcement agency.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1831 (10th ed. 2014).
11. See infra Part II.A (discussing the history of the Espionage Act); see also Caplan, supra note 8
(noting that “reinterpretation of the statute has led the government to equate leakers with spies”). Unauthorized
leaks are contrasted with leaks that are either authorized or executed on a routine basis, and such leakers are not
charged under the Espionage Act. Steven Aftergood, Some Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Info are
Routine, SECRECY NEWS (June 11, 2012), http://blogs.fas.org/secrecy/2012/06/routine_leaks (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) [hereinafter Aftergood, Some Unauthorized Disclosures] (“[T]he peculiar reality is that
certain officials routinely take it upon themselves to discuss classified information with unauthorized
persons.”). It has been suggested that some government employees who have leaked information consistent with
popular government policy have received no reprimand or penalty, whereas government employees who leak
information inconsistent with government policy face potential espionage charges. See e.g. Robert Naiman,
Amend or Repeal the Espionage Act to Protect Journalists and Whistle-blowers, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 15,
2013, 9:08 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost. com/robert-naiman/amend-or-repeal-theespio_b_3756527.html
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (explaining “[The Espionage Act] allows selective prosecution of
whistle-blowers on an extreme charge.”).
12. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Judge Learned Hand and the Espionage Act of 1917: A Mystery Unraveled,
70 U. CHI. L. REV. 335, 336, 352 (2003) (referencing in part DAVID M. KENNEDY, OVER HERE: THE FIRST
WORLD WAR AND AMERICAN SOCIETY 24 (Oxford, 25th ed. 2004) regarding Woodrow Wilson’s Third Annual
Message to Congress) (“[A]s early as 1916, in his third annual message to Congress, President Wilson ‘cited the
need for legislation to suppress disloyal activities.’”); Alan Rozenshtein, An Explainer on the Espionage Act
and the Third-Party Leak Prosecutions, LAWFARE (May 22, 2013, 1:00 PM), www.lawfairblog.com/2013/
05/an-explainer-on-the-espionage-act-and-the-third-party-leak-prosecutions (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) (explaining that the Espionage Act was enacted to stop attempts to thwart U.S. war efforts).
13. See Robert D. Epstein, Balancing National Security and Free-Speech Rights: Why Congress Should
Revise the Espionage Act, 15 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 483, 485 (2007) (“Lawmakers and judges have
characterized this language [of the Espionage Act] as ambiguous from the start.”). One of the early amendments
to the Espionage Act was the extension of what was known as the Section Act, which was later repealed in
1921. Sedition Act of May 16, 1918, 40 Stat. 553 (repealed Act of Mar. 3, 1921, 41 Stat. 1359).
14. Steven Aftergood, Recipients of “Leaks” May be Prosecuted, Court Rules, SECRECY NEWS (Aug. 10,
2006), http://blogs.fas.org/secrecy/2006/08/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (quoting Judge T.S. Ellis,
III’s opinion that recipients of leaks may be prosecuted).
15. See e.g. Harold Edgar & Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., The Espionage Statutes and Publication of Defense
Information, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 929, 942, 1045 (1973) (“Ambiguity pervades the Espionage Act,” and there is
an “overbreadth problem”).
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and Manning’s massive Wikileaks exposé, and many critics advocate for the
16
Act’s repeal or amendment.
The Espionage Act is problematic because its language encompasses more
17
conduct than what is typically understood to constitute espionage. Because of
the Act’s overbreadth, it is unclear what types of disclosures of national security
18
information the government can prosecute under the Act. As noted previously,
19
the Act was primarily aimed at criminalizing traditional acts of espionage. The
term “espionage” generally means “the activity of using spies to collect
20
information about what another government . . . is doing or plans to do.” A
“spy” is “one who secretly observes and collects secret information or
intelligence about what another government . . . is doing or plans to do; one who
21
commits espionage.” Since the 1980s, most prosecutions under the Espionage
22
Act are for leaking information that affects national security. Leaking is a
23
different problem altogether than spying in the traditional sense. The fact that
the government has prosecuted individuals engaged in activities outside the
traditional definition of spying under the Act, even though such conduct is not
clear in the statute, demonstrates the “indeterminacy about the rules of law
24
governing defense secrets.”

16. JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41404, CRIMINAL PROHIBITIONS ON THE
PUBLICATION OF CLASSIFIED DEFENSE INFORMATION 16 (2013) [hereinafter CRIMINAL PROHIBITIONS REPORT]
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review); see e.g. Naiman, supra note 11.
17. See infra Part III.A (discussing the methods of divulging sensitive information). “Espionage” is
generally understood to mean “spying” whereby a “spy” obtains information about another government for the
purposes of benefiting another. See infra notes 21–22. This method of espionage is much different from acts of
leaking or whistleblowing, which likewise may be prosecutable under the Act. Infra Part III.A.
18. See generally The Espionage Act and the Legal and Constitutional Issues Raised by WikiLeaks:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Judiciary, 111th Cong. 1 (2010) (prepared statement of Stephen I. Vladeck,
Professor of Law, Am. Univ. Wash. Coll. of Law) [hereinafter Statement of Vladeck] (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (“[T]he uncertainty surrounding this 93-year-old statute benefits no one, and leaves too
many questions unanswered about who may be held liable, and under what circumstances, for what types of
conduct.”).
19. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (regarding the concerns surrounding the Act’s enactment).
20. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 662 (10th ed. 2014).
21. Id. at 1622.
22. See e.g., United States v. Kiriakou, 898 F. Supp. 2d 921 (E.D.Va. 2012); Memorandum Opinion,
United States v. Kim, Criminal No. 10-255 (CKK) (D.D.C. May 30, 2013); Special Findings, United States. v.
Manning, Court Martial (Aug. 15, 2013) (prosecuting each of these government workers under the Espionage
Act for leaking classified information).
23. A leak generally means to intentionally disclose otherwise protected information to the media or
someone who is not entitled to receive it. Compare THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 788 (4th
ed. 2004) (defining leak as “to become publically known through a breach of secrecy” or “to disclose without
authorization or official sanction”) and THE RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 746 (2d ed.
1997) (defining leak as “a disclosure of secret, [especially] official information by an unnamed source”) with
the general definition of espionage, “[t]he activity of using spies to collect information about what another
government . . . is doing or plans to do.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 662 (10th ed. 2014).
24. Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 15, at 936.
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Additionally, advances in technology and the sophistication of the “spy”
25
have changed the face of espionage over the last century. Advances in
information technology, such as the development of the Internet, the computer,
and the smartphone, has allowed more “nontraditional” means of obtaining
sensitive data and transmitting it to an unauthorized end user to the detriment of
26
national security. Congress has not adapted the Espionage Act as
27
“nontraditional” motives or methods of alleged espionage have emerged, thus
presenting the question: what conduct constitutes espionage punishable under the
28
Espionage Act? Recently, the Espionage Act’s provisions have come under
intense public review regarding the uncertainty of how the statute applies to the
press when it publishes information it obtained from a person in a forbidden
29
30
manner. While it may seem obvious that an initial divulger could fall within
31
the legal framework of the Espionage Act, there is still a great deal of
uncertainty about when the Espionage Act applies, if it applies at all, to that

25. See KATHERINE L. HERBIG, DEFENSE PERSONNEL SECURITY RESEARCH CENTER, CHANGES IN
ESPIONAGE BY AMERICANS: 1947–2007 66, 70 (2008) [hereinafter CHANGES IN ESPIONAGE] (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (explaining “[w]hat has changed is the ubiquity of spies’ reliance on electronic files for
copying, storing, transmitting, and hiding” and that “the laptop computer, the thumb drive storage device, and
the Internet have only made espionage quicker and easier”). In addition, the author points to eleven individuals
who conducted espionage activities between 2000 and 2007, most of which “made use of computer technology
to retrieve, store, and transfer information,” with “many of them [making] use of the Internet to make or
maintain contact with customers.” Id.
26. See id. and accompanying text.
27. See Aftergood, supra note 14 (quoting Judge T.S. Ellis, III’s opinion that “provisions of the
Espionage Act ‘have remained largely unchanged since the administration of William Howard Taft’”). See also
CHANGES IN ESPIONAGE, supra note 25, at 32, 70 (showing changes in motives of spies over time). Some
historical motives for espionage include money, divided loyalties, disgruntlement, ingratiation, coercion, thrills,
and recognition or ego. Id. If leaking and whistleblowing are to be considered acts of espionage, then these may
present additional changes in motive, something the Espionage Act fails to take into account. See infra Part
III.A (discussing methods of divulging sensitive information).
28. This question also includes: who can be charged with espionage under the statute? See infra note 30
and accompanying text.
29. CRIMINAL PROHIBITIONS REPORT, supra note 16; see e.g. Caplan, supra note 8 (discussing issues on
the publication of sensitive information).
30. The term “initial divulger” is intended to mean the first individual who discloses information in a way
that is prohibited by the Espionage Act (which is typically a government official who has access to sensitive or
classified national security information). It is used as a blanket term as opposed to “leaker” or “whistleblower”
or “spy,” which are distinct from one another. See infra Part III.A (discussing who and how information is
divulged). While the Espionage Act presumably covers more than just the initial divulger, including third-party
recipients of sensitive information, this Comment focuses primarily on the initial divulger and whether his
actions fall within the meaning of the language of Espionage Act. See also Statement of Vladeck, supra note 18,
at 2 (“[T]he Espionage Act does not focus solely on the initial party who wrongfully discloses national defense
information, but applies, in its terms, to anyone who knowingly disseminates, distributes, or even retains
national defense information without immediately returning the material to the government officer authorized to
possess it. In other words, the text of the Act draws no distinction between the leaker, the recipient of the leak,
or the 100th person to redistribute . . . the national defense information that, by this point, is already in the
public domain.”).
31. See Viewpoints: The Bradley Manning Verdict, BBC NEWS (July 30, 2013, 5:40 PM), http://www.
bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-23511145 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (with Nathan Sales noting
that “Manning’s conviction is a fairly routine application of well-settled legal principles.”).
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initial divulger whose actions and motivations are at the epicenter of heated
32
public debate.
This Comment proposes that the Espionage Act needs revision as applied to
the initial divulger of protected information in order to remove ambiguity and
allow a more consistent and appropriate application of the law. Moreover, the
Espionage Act should provide certainty as to what conduct constitutes espionage
or what conduct is punishable under its provisions, as well as potentially deter
33
and prevent leaks. Part II provides a brief history of the Espionage Act and a
breakdown of its most notable sections. Part III looks specifically at what the
Espionage Act says in its most troublesome sections by analyzing the statutory
language, legislative history, and appellate and pending cases in order to
illustrate its ambiguity, overly broad terminology, and confusing provisions. Part
IV proposes changes to the Act that will result in a clearer and more consistent
application of the law thus enabling the government to effectively prosecute
legitimate acts of espionage and detrimental leaks by an initial divulger of
protected information.
II. THE ESPIONAGE ACT
“If there should be disloyalty, it will be dealt with with a firm hand of
stern repression.”
34
—President Woodrow Wilson
A. A Brief History of the Espionage Act
In April 1917, the United States marched into the heat of battle in World War
I, and had a legitimate concern “to try to stop the real threat of subversion,
sabotage, and malicious interference with the war effort, including the
35
controversial reinstatement of the draft.” But Congress hotly debated the scope
32. Compare John Cassidy, Why Edward Snowden is a Hero, THE NEW YORKER (June 10, 2013),
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/johncassidy/2013/06/why-edward-snowden-is-a-hero.html (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review) (explaining why Snowden should be characterized as a hero while
acknowledging some disagree), with Jeffrey Toobin, Why Edward Snowden is No Hero, THE NEW YORKER
(June 10, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/online/ blogs/comment/2013/06/edward-snowden-nsa-leaker-isno-hero.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (explaining why Snowden is not a hero nor a
whistleblower, characterizing him as “ a grandiose narcissist who deserves to be in prison.”).
33. It is clear that the United States Government wants to prosecute leaks because they do not want to
give the indication that such disclosure would be acceptable or unpunishable. See generally Caplan, supra note
8 (explaining that “the government seems more concerned about maintaining control than doing justice”). This
lends itself to the prevention aspect by not allowing “copycats” or an increase in potentially compromising
leaks.
34. MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT WILSON TO CONGRESS, Apr. 2, 1917, in 55 CONG. REC. 104 (1917)
[hereinafter MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT WILSON].
35. Rozenshtein, supra note 12 (quoting David Greenberg); see Kennedy, supra note 12, at 24 (“During
the period of American neutrality, German agents had committed acts of sabotage and tried to foment labor
troubles in East Coast ports and factories, in order to disrupt the delivery of war material to the Allies. In 1915
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of the Espionage Act, which was originally much broader than the version
36
actually passed. Indeed, some critics point to President Wilson’s ulterior motive
of establishing “broad controls” that “would have given the President full power
to restrict the divulgence of government secrets, public access to defense places,
37
and public discussion and reporting of matters relating to the war.” However,
Congress declined to pass proposed provisions such as censoring the press and
filtering the mail, and eventually agreed upon the 1917 version of the Espionage
38
Act.
President Wilson, in asking Congress to declare war, remarked that “[f]rom
the very outset of the present war it has filled our unsuspecting communities and
even our offices of government with spies and set criminal intrigues everywhere
afoot against our national unity of counsel, our peace within and without, our
39
industries and our commerce.” The President’s real concern was spies within
the government having access to national defense information and
40
communicating that protected information to wartime enemies. But even if the
Espionage Act was necessary to address perceived concerns, it proved difficult to
41
apply from its onset. Eager prosecutors punished many anti-war dissidents
42
under the Act’s expansive provisions. Prosecutors use the Act as a general
sanction to prosecute any perceived disloyal conduct, and not necessarily for
43
wrongful disclosures of national defense information. The legislative history

Wilson had expelled the German military and naval attachés from the country for their connection with those
intrigues. . . . [President Wilson] had [also] gone on in late 1915 and 1916 to launch a broad attack against socalled hyphenated Americans.”).
36. Epstein, supra note 13, at 486.
37. Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 15, at 946.
38. Rozenshtein, supra note 12.
39. MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT WILSON, supra note 34, at 104.
40. Stephen Vladeck on Espionage Act (C-SPAN live broadcast Mar. 10, 2012), available at http://www.
c-span.org/video/?304857-5/stephen-vladeck-espionage-act (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
41. Epstein, supra note 13, at 485; Caitlin Dewey, Manning was Charged Under the Espionage Act. It
Doesn’t Have a Proud History, WASH. POST (July 31, 2013), www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/
2013/07/31/manning-was-charged-under-the -espionage-act-it-doesnt-have-a-proud-history/ (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
42. Dewey, supra note 41; see David Greenberg, The Hidden History of the Espionage Act, SLATE (Dec.
27, 2010), www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/history_lesson?2010/12/the_hidden_history_of_the_
espionage_act.1.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (noting that “[the Espionage Act], even in its
softer version, left far too much room for aggressive prosecutors and overzealous patriots to interpret it as they
wished.”). See e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47-48, 52-53 53 (1919) (upholding Schenck’s
conviction under the Espionage Act for distribution of leaflets criticizing the war, and ultimately holding that
the Espionage Act did not violate his free speech rights).
43. Greenberg, supra note 42. While the prosecutions of anti-war protesters were excessive, it is uncertain
how many prosecutions were for leaks or disclosures of defense information, if any. See id. (“U.S. attorneys in
Thomas Gregory’s Justice Department prosecuted socialists, pacifists, and German-Americans on flimsy
grounds. Many people were arrested for crimes of mere speech. . . . Of 1,500 arrests under the law, only 10
involved actual sabotage. To the dismay of progressives, moreover, not even the Supreme Court stopped the
prosecutions. In March 1919, the liberal icon Oliver Wendell Holmes, coining his famous ‘clear and present
danger’ standard, led the court in upholding three dubious Espionage Act verdicts, including the conviction of
Debs.”). See e.g. Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211–212 (1919); Schenck, 249 U.S. at 48-49 (convicted under
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and contentious discussions that surrounded the law’s enactment indicate that the
44
public frowned upon overzealous prosecutions under the Act’s provisions.
These prosecutions did not seem to fit the type of conduct the legislature meant
45
to criminalize—traditional acts of spying and sabotage. Congress has amended
46
the Espionage Act several times, but the most pertinent sections of the Act
under which most past and present prosecutions occur remain largely unchanged
47
from the 1917 version.
B. The Core Sections of the Espionage Act
The Espionage Act contains seven sections, but most uncertainty stems from
48
sections 793 and 794, which each contain various subsections. Section 793 is
probably the most confusing section because it encompasses multiple
49
circumstances for which one can be prosecuted under the Act.
1. Section 793
Generally, this section criminalizes disclosures of information “respecting”
50
or “relating to” the national defense.
Subsections 793(a) and (b) are often lumped together in explaining their
51
applicability. These subsections prohibit “obtaining information respecting the
national defense with intent or reason to believe that the information is to be used
to the injury of the United States, or to the advantage of any foreign nation” by
entering a military installation, obtaining information concerning military-related
activities, or otherwise gathering information “connected with the national
52
defense.” Thus, based on the statutory language, the initial divulger must have
the requisite scienter, “intent or reason to believe” that the information could be
53
used to injure the U.S. This scienter must exist when there is any revelation of

the Espionage Act for actions that the government perceived as detrimental to the war effort).
44. Greenberg, supra note 42.
45. Id.
46. See supra note 13 (regarding the Sedition Act amendment and repeal).
47. Epstein, supra note 13, at 493; Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 15, at 939.
48. 18 U.S.C. §§ 792–798 (2012); Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 15, at 937–38.
49. See infra Part II.B.1 (discussing the confusion surrounding this provision).
50. 18 U.S.C. § 793.
51. Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 15, at 967–68; GEOFFREY R. STONE, FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER,
GOVERNMENT SECRECY V. FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 36 (2006) [hereinafter GOVERNMENT SECRECY] (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review).
52. 18 U.S.C. § 793(a)–(b).
53. The requisite injury includes the entire phrase “injury to the United States, or advantage of any
foreign nation,” although it may be truncated at times throughout the Comment for brevity.
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54

“information respecting the national defense.” In short, these subsections
55
“prohibit the collection of” information relating to the national defense.
Subsection 793(c) extends to individuals beyond the initial divulger, in that it
forbids anyone who “obtains or agrees or attempts to receive” documents and
other tangible items “connected with the national defense, knowing or having
reason to believe . . . that [such information] has or will be obtained” by a person
56
who has violated a provision of the Act. In this provision, there is no facial
intent requirement as in 793(a) or (b); the recipient or potential recipient need
only have “know[ledge]” or “reason to believe” that the initial divulger obtained
57
the information in a manner inconsistent with other sections of the Act. Thus,
this subsection “prohibits the receipt of” information connected with the national
defense, including attempts at receipt of such information, if the recipient knows
or should know that the initial divulger “violated some other provision of the
58
Espionage Act.”
Subsections 793(d) and (e) apply specifically, and most sweepingly, to the
59
initial divulger (and potentially to third party publishers). Subsections 793(d)
and (e) prohibit a person “lawfully having possession of” or a person having
“unauthorized possession of,” respectively, tangible items or information
“relating to the national defense” which the “possessor has reason to believe
could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign
nation, [from] willfully communicat[ing], deliver[ing], transmit[ing], or
cause[ing] to be communicated [such information] . . . to any person not entitled
60
to receive it.” Under these subsections, a divulger need only “willfully”
communicate the information rather than communicate “with intent or reason to
61
believe” as in other sections. Thus, “willful” disclosure may be easier for
62
prosecutors to demonstrate since it does not require a showing of specific intent.
The government charges and ultimately prosecutes or pleads out many
63
leakers under section 793(d) or 793(e), likely because the subsections are
extremely broad and do not require any specific criminal intent that the

54. 18 U.S.C. § 793(a)–(b).
55. GOVERNMENT SECRECY, supra note 51, at 36.
56. 18 U.S.C. § 793(c).
57. Id. § 793(a)–(c); Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 15, at 938.
58. GOVERNMENT SECRECY, supra note 51, at 36–37.
59. Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 15, at 938.
60. 18 U.S.C. § 793(d)–(e).
61. GOVERNMENT SECRECY, supra note 51, at 37, 39 (intent as in section 793(a)–(b) and 794(a)–(b)).
62. Id. at 37.
63. See e.g. United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1063 (4th Cir.1988) (charged and prosecuted under
sections 793(d), (e)); United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602, 607, 610 (E.D.Va. 2006) (charged and
prosecuted under sections 793(d), (e), among other charges); Special Findings, United States v. Manning, Court
Martial (Aug. 15, 2013) (charged and prosecuted under section 793(e), among other charges); Memorandum
Opinion, United States v. Kim, Criminal No. 10-255 (CKK) (D.D.C. May 30, 2013) (charged and pending
prosecution under section 793(d)); Criminal Complaint, United States v. Snowden, No. 1:13 CR 265 (E.D.Va.
June 14, 2013) (charged under section 793(d), among other charges).
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64

information will be used to injure the United States. Similarly, the media could
violate section 793(e) by publishing leaked information, even in absence of
65
actual intent, if they “willfully” communicated the information.
2. Section 794
Generally, this section covers the traditional understanding of a “spy,” and
66
addresses providing information to aid a foreign government.
Subsection 794(a) criminalizes the communication or transmission of any
tangible item or “information relating to the national defense” to a foreign
government or citizen thereof with “intent or reason to believe that it is to be
67
used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign nation.”
68
It carries with it a possible death sentence. Like 793(a) and (b), prosecutors
69
must prove intent under this section.
Subsection 794(b) provides that an individual “in time of war, with the intent
that the same shall be communicated to the enemy . . . communicates or attempts
to elicit any information” regarding military operations “which might be useful to
70
the enemy, shall be punished by death or by imprisonment.” This provision is
narrower than subsection 793(a) because it applies only during wartime and only
to the communication of information to an enemy, as opposed to any foreign
71
nation.
III. THE TROUBLE WITH PROSECUTING ESPIONAGE UNDER THE ESPIONAGE ACT
AND THE NEED FOR CHANGE
“Technically, we whistleblowers broke the law, but we felt, as many have
felt before, that the obligation to our consciences and basic human rights
is stronger than our obligation to obey the law.”
72
—Shamai Leibowitz

64. See GOVERNMENT SECRECY, supra note 51, at 37 (“Section 793(e) therefore appears to have a far
more relaxed intent requirement than §§ 793(a) and 793(b). The provision does not require specific intent so
long as the communication or retention of classified information is willful.”).
65. Id.
66. 18 U.S.C. § 794.
67. Id. § 794(a).
68. Id..
69. Id. §§ 793(a)-(b), 794(a).
70. Id. § 794(b). Section 794 also contains subsections (c)–(d) which cover inchoate liability and
sentencing, respectively. Id. §794(c)–(d).
71. Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 15, at 945.
72. Shamai Leibowitz, Blowback from the White House’s Vindictive War on Whistleblowers, The
GUARDIAN (July 5, 2013, 8:30 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jul/05/blowback-whitehouse-whistleblowers (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). Leibowitz was formerly a contract linguist for
the FBI who leaked classified information to an online blogger. Id. In December 2009, he was charged under
section 798(a)(3) of the Espionage Act for willful disclosure of classified information, and ultimately took a
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Nearly forty years ago, scholars pointed out that “[a]mbiguity pervades the
73
Espionage Act.” Yet, despite various proposals to amend the Act, it remains
74
substantially similar to its 1917 form. In addition, the evolved methods of
divulging information, including leaks and whistleblowing, need consideration in
75
prosecuting an individual under the Espionage Act.
A. Methods of Divulging Information by an Individual Working for or on Behalf
of the Government
The Espionage Act is problematic because it lumps together different types
76
of conduct, without clear differentiation, for which a person can be prosecuted.
This type of conduct goes beyond classic espionage, but the government does not
77
seem interested in distinguishing “leaking” from “espionage.” Although not
express, modernly, there appear to be three primary categorizations of conduct
that could ultimately lead to prosecution for the initial divulger under the
Espionage Act: (1) improper whistleblowing; (2) impermissible leaking; and (3)
78
spying. While these categorizations may just be labels, the characterizations are
important because the motivations, methods of disclosure, and target recipients
79
differ.
1. Whistleblowing
A whistleblower is “[a]n employee who reports employer wrongdoing to a
80
governmental or law-enforcement agency.” A whistleblower’s primary motive
plea deal for 20 months in prison. Id.; Criminal Complaint, United States v. Leibowitz, No. AW09 CR 0632 (D.
Md. Dec. 4, 2009).
73. Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 15, at 942.
74. See e.g. Steven Aftergood, Senate Bill Would Make Leaks a Felony, SECRECY NEWS (Feb. 17, 2011),
http://blogs.fas.org/secrecy/2011/02/cardin_leaks (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (discussing a 2011
proposal to amend the Espionage Act to criminalize disclosure of any classified information, as well as the
SHIELD act, a proposal to criminalize unauthorized disclosure of information related to human intelligence
activities); The Espionage Act of 1917, 40 Stat. 217–20.
75. See supra Part II.A (discussing the types of conduct that constitute espionage).
76. See e.g. 18 U.S.C. §§ 793–794; see also supra Part II.B (discussing these core sections of the
Espionage Act).
77. See supra Part II.B (discussing the basic provisions of the Espionage Act); see also Caplan supra note
8 (noting “[t]he executive branch . . . has little incentive to give up any tool of law useful in deterring
terrorism.”).
78. See generally Statement of Vladeck, supra note 18, at 2 (“[T]he government has traditionally been
forced to shoehorn into the Espionage Act three distinct classes of cases that raise three distinct sets of issues:
classic espionage; leaking; and the retention or redistribution of national defense information by private
citizens.”) While “whistleblowing” is a form of “leaking” if the whistleblower improperly discloses sensitive
information, this Comment distinguishes this conduct because of the subjective intent of the whistleblower. See
infra Part III.A.2 (distinguishing improper whistleblowing and unauthorized leaking).
79. See Statement of Vladeck, supra note 18, at 2 (discussing the Espionage Act’s deficiency in dealing
with disclosure of information in non-espionage cases, forcing the government to categorize the issues).
80. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1831 (10th ed. 2014).
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81

is to speak out against government misconduct. Comparatively, the
82
Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 defines a whistleblower as someone who
“reasonably believes [government conduct] evidences [a] violation of [a] law,
rule, or regulation or gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of
83
authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety.”
However, a whistleblower must be able to prove “illegal or improper government
84
activities” as opposed to self-perceived assertions of immoral or illegal conduct.
The whistleblower must follow a set of internal procedures to properly blow the
85
whistle on such misconduct. When a perceived whistleblower improperly
discloses protected information in pursuit of blowing the whistle on government
misconduct, the inquiry becomes, to what extent should the Espionage Act
apply? The whistleblower’s subjective intent is to do “a good thing” or merely
inform the American public of government wrongdoing, not to harm to the
86
United States or otherwise help a foreign government. Although whistleblower
statutes do not cover all government employees and the procedures can result in a
lengthy reporting process, potential employer retaliation, or other undesirable
87
consequences, Congress enacted such laws to protect whistleblowers by
81. L. PAIGE WHITAKER CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33918, THE WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION ACT:
AN OVERVIEW 1 (Mar. 12, 2007) [hereinafter CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS] (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
82. 5 U.S.C. § 1221 (2012).
83. Id. § 2302(b)(8)(A)(i)–(ii). However, the employee must be covered under the Act in order to enjoy
its categorizations and protections. See infra note 88 and accompanying text (explaining the provisions of the
Act).
84. CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, supra note 81, at 1.
85. See e.g., id. (regarding the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989,
[g]enerally, whistleblower protections may be raised within four forums or proceedings:
(1) employee appeals to Merit Systems Protection Board of an agency’s adverse action
against an employee, known as ‘Chapter 77’ appeals; (2) actions instituted by the Office of
Special Counsel; (3) individually maintained rights of action before the Merit Systems
Protection Board (known as an individual right of action, or IRA); and (4) grievances
brought by the employee under negotiated grievance procedures.).
There are several other federal statutes and directives that protect whistleblowers, but they are not
comprehensive, and leave several government workers unaccounted for. See infra note 88 and accompanying
text (discussing the different statutes and directives that cover whistleblowing and their shortcomings).
86. See e.g. Andrea Peterson, Snowden: I Raised NSA Concerns Internally Over 10 Times Before Going
Rogue, WASH. POST (Mar. 7, 2014, 10:58 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/
03/07/snowden-i-raised-nsa-concerns-internally-over-10-times-before-going-rogue/?print=1 (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (“Edward Snowden said that he repeatedly tried to go through official channels to raise
concerns about government snooping programs.”), but see Agence France-Presse, Snowden Didn’t Raise
Concerns Internally: NSA, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 13, 2014, 6:21 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/afpsnowden-didnt-raise-concerns-internally-nsa-2014-9 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (explaining that
the NSA’s internal investigation found nothing to support Snowden’s assertion that he raised concerns about the
NSA’s surveillance programs to agency officials).
87. See e.g. Peterson, supra note 86 (quoting Edward Snowden regarding his decision to expose classified
information through the media)
Yes. I had reported these clearly problematic programs to more than ten distinct officials,
none of whom took any action to address them. As an employee of a private company
rather than a direct employee of the US government, I was not protected by the US
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allowing them to bring forth grievances in a manner that does not violate the
88
Espionage Act. While the public might use the term “whistleblower” to mean
someone that generally reveals government misconduct, this perception does not
necessarily bring that individual within the protection of the whistleblower
89
statutes. Even if the information exposes illegal government conduct, the
divulger is not a legal whistleblower if he or she does not follow the proper
90
channels of reporting. If an individual discloses protected information to the
media, it would constitute leaking notwithstanding the individual’s well91
intentioned disclosure.
2. Leaking
Leaking, on the other hand, has no legal definition; it largely remains an
92
informal term. However, a typical leak is an intentional disclosure of otherwise
93
protected information to the media or someone who is not entitled to receive it.
Section 793 of the Espionage Act broadly covers this type of conduct, albeit
94
confusingly. This is because the motive or intent behind such leaks are difficult
to ascertain, and the scienter element differs depending on which subsection of
95
the Espionage Act such conduct falls into. Leaks generally fall into one of three
whistleblower laws, and I would not have been protected from retaliation and legal
sanction for revealing classified information about lawbreaking in accordance with the
recommended process.
Id.
88. 5 U.S.C. §§ 1201–1222 (2012). This law is known as the Whistleblower Protection Act, but does not
apply to members of the intelligence community or enable any whistleblower defense in a criminal case. Id.;
Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105–272, §§ 702–703, 112 Stat.
2396 24–17 (allowing members of the intelligence community to report “urgent concerns,” including concerns
referencing classified information, through the Inspector General, but does not provide retaliation protections or
allow a whistleblower defense in a criminal case); Inspector General Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. App. § 7 (providing
a mechanism by which Department of Defense employees can file a complaint without reprisal or revelation of
identity); Protecting Whistleblowers with Access to Public Information, PRESIDENTIAL POLICY DIRECTIVE 19
(Oct. 10, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (providing protections to intelligence agency
members whistleblowers with access to classified information, but leaving several gaps, such as the inclusion of
government contractors within its directives); 10 U.S.C. § 1034 (2012) (protecting communications by military
members to Congress and the Inspector General and prohibiting retaliation against a military member).
89. See e.g. Erik Wemple, Edward Snowden: ‘Leaker,’ ‘Source,’ or ‘Whistleblower,’ WASH. POST (June
10, 2013, 9:03AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/erik-wemple/wp/2013/06/10/edward-snowdenleaker-source-or-whistleblower (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (quoting Glenn Greenwald of The
Guardian) (“I don’t think ‘whistleblower’ requires revelation of illegal conduct.”); See also Peterson, supra
note 86 (explaining that Edward Snowden’s employment status would not allow him protection under US
whistleblower laws).
90. CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, supra note 81, at 1.
91. See supra Part III.A. (noting that whistleblowing is a type of leaking, but is distinguishable for
purposes of the Espionage Act as to the extent subjective intent applies).
92. See generally Wemple, supra note 89 (discussing the trouble with defining and construing the terms
used).
93. See supra note 23 and accompanying text (generally defining “leaking” and “spying”).
94. See infra Part III.B. (regarding the confusing language of the Espionage Act).
95. Steven Aftergood, Not all Leaks of Classified Information Violate the Law, SECRECY NEWS (June 13,
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categories: (1) unauthorized leaks; (2) authorized leaks; and (3) third party
96
leaks.
Unauthorized leaks can easily fall within the broad language of Sections
793(d) and (e) of the Espionage Act—that is, the willful communication or
transmission of “information relating to the national defense” to persons “not
97
entitled to receive it.” Essentially, the Act prohibits the disclosure of such
information without proper authorization because the information is supposed to
98
remain protected.
Authorized leaks, or leaks that are not considered criminal, are typically
disclosures of sensitive information that occur with permission or happen on a
99
routine basis. These types of leaks largely go unpunished, unnoticed, and
unacknowledged as leaks at all, and are often difficult to distinguish from
100
unauthorized leaks.
Third party leaks typically concern the publication of sensitive information
by a third party who received the information from a primary divulger (that is,
101
the third party did not have first-hand knowledge of the information). The third
party recipient is generally a media or news source who publishes the
102
information for public distribution. While there has been at least one
prosecution of a non-news media third party recipient who subsequently
103
disclosed the protected information, typically third party leaks occur through

2012), http://fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/2012/06/061312.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review)
[hereinafter Aftergood, Not all Leaks].; see supra Part II.B (describing the subsections of the Espionage Act).
96. See generally Aftergood, Not all Leaks, supra note 95 (explaining that “there is no law that
categorically prohibits the release of classified information.”); see also Steven Aftergood, Dept of Defense to
Report on “Authorized Leaks,” SECRECY NEWS (Oct. 15, 2013), http://fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/2013/10/
101513.html [hereinafter Aftergood, Dept of Defense] (regarding different characteristics for which leaks can be
criminal).
97. 18 U.S.C. § 793(d)–(e) (2012).
98. See generally Steven Aftergood, What is an Unauthorized Disclosure, SECRECY NEWS (Aug. 1,
2012), http://blogs.fas.org/secrecy/2012/08/unauthorized_disclosure (on file with the McGeorge Law Review)
[hereinafter Aftergood, What is an Unauthorized Disclosure] (noting “[t]hough the answer may seem obvious,
it is actually subject to conflicting interpretations.”).
99. See Aftergood, Some Unauthorized Disclosures, supra note 11 (noting that “classified information is
frequently disclosed at the interface between national security agencies and the news media . . . [I]t is how the
system normally functions.”). “[T]he peculiar reality is that certain officials routinely take it upon themselves to
discuss classified information with unauthorized persons.” Id.
100. See Aftergood, Not all Leaks, supra note 95 (“Even when ‘national defense’ information that is
clearly covered by the [Espionage] Act is disclosed to an unauthorized person, it does not necessarily follow
that a crime has been committed.”). The “requisite criminal intent” must also be present in order to be
prosecuted under the Espionage Act. Id. See also Aftergood, What is an Unauthorized Disclosure, supra note
98 (“A new Department of Defense directive requires the Pentagon to notify Congress whenever a DoD official
discloses classified intelligence to a reporter on an authorized basis.”). See e.g., Naiman, supra note 11
(explaining “[The Espionage Act] allows selective prosecution of whistle-blowers on an extreme charge.”).
101. CRIMINAL PROHIBITIONS REPORT, supra note 16, at 16.
102. Id.
103. United States v. Rosen, 445 F.Supp.2d 602, 643 (E.D.Va. 2006) (involving unauthorized disclosure
by a government employee to others who worked for or with the government who subsequently published the
information); see infra notes 134–138 and accompanying text (discussing United States v. Rosen).
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104

press publication. However, it remains unclear whether the federal government
can prosecute a media recipient under the Espionage Act for publication of such
105
defense information, specifically under subsection 793(e).
3. Spying
A “spy” is “one who secretly observes and collects secret information or
intelligence about what another government . . . is doing or plans to do; one who
106
commits espionage.” Traditionally, spying involved the clandestine collection
of information from one government and transmission of information to another
107
government or adversary who has employed the spy. Section 794 of the
108
Espionage Act broadly covers this type of conduct. Generally, most acts by
individuals who are charged under section 794 are obvious violations and
109
ultimately the spy enters a plea agreement. With virtually no case law on the
matter, the application of section 794 remains unclear, as do the applications of
110
other sections of the Act.
B. The Confusing Language
Much of the ambiguity in the Espionage Act stems from the language of the
111
statute itself. Two distinct elements of the statutory language pose challenges to
the interpretation and understanding of the Espionage Act: (1) the type of
112
information that the Act prohibits from disclosure, and (2) the requisite intent.

104. CRIMINAL PROHIBITIONS REPORT, supra note 16, at 16.
105. The issue of whether or not third party publication is punishable under the Espionage Act is outside
the scope of this Comment, but an important consideration in amending the Espionage Act. For more
information, see CRIMINAL PROHIBITIONS REPORT, supra note 16, and GOVERNMENT SECRECY, supra note 51.
106. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1622 (10th ed. 2014).
107. See FBI COUNTERINTELLIGENCE NATIONAL STRATEGY, A BLUEPRINT FOR PROTECTING U.S.
SECRETS, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (2011), available at http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2011/
november/counterintelligence_110411 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (describing how spying is no
longer just “passing U.S. secrets to foreign governments, either to fatten [spies’] own wallets or to advance their
ideological agendas.”).
108. 18 U.S.C. § 794 (2012).
109. See e.g. Famous Cases & Criminals: Aldrich Hazen Ames, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/history/famous-cases/aldrich-hazen-ames (last visited Nov. 16, 2014) (on file with
the McGeorge Law Review) (regarding former CIA agent Aldrich Ames, charged under subsection 794(d) of the
Espionage Act for spying for Russia and who pled guilty for a sentence of life in prison); Plea Agreement,
United States v. Hanssen, Cr. No. 01-188-A (E.D.Va. July 6, 2001) (charging former FBI agent Robert Hanssen
under subsection 794(a) and (c) of the Espionage Act for spying for Soviet and Russian intelligence services,
who pled guilty in exchange for life in prison).
110. See infra section III.B (regarding the confusing language in the core sections of the Espionage Act).
111. Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 15, at 938–39.
112. See id. (stating that
“[t]he major questions concerning the espionage statutes are: (1) what type of revelation or
communication is a necessary element of the particular offense. . . . (2) what state of mind with
respect to the consequences for United States’ interests is made a material element of the
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The following sections analyze the problems with modern “espionage” by
delving into the statutory language, the legislative history, and the applicable
113
case law for each of the contentious elements of the Act.
1. Information Respecting, Connected to, or Relating to the National
Defense
Under subsections 793(a)–(e) and 794(a)–(b), the information that the
divulger disclosed must be one of the multiple items specifically listed or
114
information relating to, connected to, or respecting the national defense. Thus,
these sections purport to make disclosure of any information respecting the
115
national defense criminal. Broadly construed, this means that anything
rationally or conceivably tied to national security could be subject to charges
116
under the Act.
The legislative history notes that some Congress Members cautioned against
117
the broad and sweeping language, but such language went unchanged. The
acceptance of such an expansive phrase was predominately based on a lack of
alternative terminology or limiting specificity; the legislature intended to ensure
that the statute adequately encompassed all information the government believed
118
to be sensitive. The 64th and 65th Congresses did not consider the term
“classified” because the United States had not yet adopted a formal system of
119
classification. Classified information is information identified by a designated
classification authority as requiring “protection in the interests of preserving

different offenses. . . . and (3) what information is subjected to statutory restraints under the
various standards ranging from ‘information related to the national defense’ to ‘classified
communications intelligence’”).
113. See infra Part III.B.1–2 (discussing the confusion with the Espionage Act).
114. 18 U.S.C. §§ 793(a)–(e), 794(a)–(b) (2012) (each of the subsections say either “respecting,”
“connected to,” or “relating to the national defense”).
115. Id.
116. See Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 15, at 969 (noting “[t]he principal problem in construing [‘national
defense’] is to find its limits in an era when every facet of civilian life may have an important bearing on the
nation’s military capabilities.”).
117. See e.g., 54 CONG. REC. 3485 (1917) (Senator Cummins asking “What is the national defense? Those
words are not defined; they are in no ways qualified or restricted. . . . I should think that it would include
everything from the mines and the forests which ultimately passes into the structures or the arms that are used in
war, no matter whether they are used immediately in battle, or whether they are used in general connection with
the Army or Navy.”).
118. See e.g., 54 CONG. REC. 3601 (1917) (Senator Overman stating “[i]t would be impossible to specify
these places. . . . we made [the term ‘national defense’] general to protect everything connected with the
national defense.”).
119. The United States classification system formally came into existence in 1940, and involves
“identifying . . . information which requires protection in the interests of preserving national security.” N. Cathy
Maus, Office of Declassification, History of Classification and Declassification, FED’N OF AM. SCIENTISTS
(July, 22, 1996) available at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/doe/history.htm (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
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national security.” The Espionage Act does not define the term “national
121
defense,” nor is the meaning of the term obvious on its face. Modernly, a
substantial amount of sensitive information relating to the national defense is
122
classified. With the ambiguous term “national defense” in the statute and little
123
precedent, judges are left to interpret what this term encompasses.
In Gorin v. United States, the United States Supreme Court interpreted the
124
meaning of the term “related to the national defense.” In 1940, Gorin, a citizen
of the U.S.S.R., paid Salich, a United States Naval Intelligence Officer, for
125
counterintelligence reports regarding Japanese movement and other activities.
The government charged both men under sections 793(b) and 794(a) of the
126
The defendants asserted that the Espionage Act was
Espionage Act.
127
“unconstitutional as violative of due process because of indefiniteness.” They
argued that the statute was unconstitutionally vague because virtually everything
128
can relate to the national defense. The court rejected the defense, finding that
129
the scienter requirement sufficiently limits the phrase. In defining the term, the
court stated, “[n]ational defense. . .‘is a generic concept of broad connotations,
referring to the military and naval establishments and the related activities of
130
national preparedness.’”
Without much discussion, the court held the
counterintelligence reports at issue could be related to the national defense and
131
sent the question to the jury. The jury found the reports were connected with
132
military activity, and thus, related to the national defense.
In United States v. Rosen, the court further interpreted the phrase “relating to
133
the national defense”. There, prosecutors charged Steven Rosen, the former
director of foreign policy issues of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee
(AIPAC), along with Keith Weissman, the former senior Middle East analyst for
AIPAC, under subsections 793(e) and (g) of the Espionage Act for disclosing
134
classified intelligence and foreign policy reports on the Middle East. Lawrence
120. Id.
121. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 792–798 (2012) (showing that the term “national defense” is not explicitly
defined).
122. See generally Maus, supra note 119 and accompanying text (explaining process of classification and
how it relates to national defense).
123. Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 15, at 974.
124. Id.; Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19, 25 (1941).
125. Gorin, 312 U.S. at 22–23.
126. Id. at 21–22 (formerly sections 1(b) and 2(a) under the original Espionage Act of 1917, 40 Stat. 217–
220).
127. Id. at 23.
128. See id. at 24 (“Petitioners argue that the statute should not be construed so as to leave to a jury to
determine whether an innocuous report on a crop yield is “connected” with the national defense.”).
129. Id. at 27–28; see infra Part III.B.2 (discussing the scienter element under those subsections).
130. Gorin, 312 U.S. at 28.
131. Id. at 31–32; Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 15, at 975–76.
132. Gorin, 312 U.S. at 31–32.
133. United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602 (E.D. Va. 2006).
134. Epstein, supra note 13, at 499–500.

527

2014 / The Changing Face of Espionage
Franklin, a former analyst who worked for the Office of the Secretary of the
135
Department of Defense, provided the reports to Rosen and Weissman. Similar
to Gorin and Salich, Rosen and Weissman proffered the theory that the phrase
136
“information related to the national defense” was unconstitutionally vague.
While the court conceded that the phrase was ambiguous, it determined that
“information relating to the national defense” had previously been held to mean
137
“government secrets” that could be potentially damaging to national security.
Because precedent established a definition, the court dismissed the defense,
138
finding the term did not violate due process.
The scope of what information is sufficiently related to the national defense
is broad and wide-reaching, and has not been adequately defined through case
139
law or otherwise. There is no clear definition of what information falls under
the definition of “national defense,” and there is no incorporation of the currently
used classification system that characterizes information the government
140
determines needs special safeguarding.
2. The Intent Requirement
Aside from the lack of clarity about what disclosures the Espionage Act
applies to, the intent requirement in sections 793 and 794 add their own element
of confusion. There are three intent standards in sections 793 and 794: an “intent
or reason to believe,” a willful disclosure, and a disclosure that injures the United
States or is advantageous to a foreign nation.
a. Intent or Reason to Believe
The intent requirement in sections 793(a)–(b) and 794(a) further complicates
the application of the Act, especially because the motivations for disclosing
141
protected information have evolved over the last century. Take the case of a
135. Id. Franklin was the initial divulger of the information and Rosen and Weissman were third-party
recipients/publishers. Id.
136. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 607.
137. Id. at 612, 622; see also Epstein, supra note 13, at 501 (discussing the Rosen case and that the Judge
“reasoned that judicial precedent [had] limited and clarified ‘information relating to the national defense’ as any
government secret, the unauthorized disclosure of which could threaten the national security.”).
138. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 622.
139. Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 15, at 986.
140. See id. (based on case law, “secrecy [may be] the litmus of defense-relatedness and thus put
government classification at the fore, despite the multiplicity of purposes which secrecy in fact serves. The
expansive reach of the term [information related to the national defense] leaves all-important whether Gorin
was correct in regarding the statute’s culpability formulation as adequate to fend off the dangers of
overbreadth.”).
141. See generally Goitein, supra note 9 (“Disclosures of classified information come in all different
forms. On one end of the spectrum, there are acts of espionage designed to harm the country by providing
highly sensitive information to any enemy. On the other end, there are revelations of government wrongdoing
by patriotic public servants who carefully avoid any disclosure of truly sensitive information. And there is
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proclaimed whistleblower who discloses protected information to the public in
order to expose alleged government wrongdoing, rather than to injure the United
142
States in any way. If certain subsections of the Act require that the discloser
intend to injure the United States, then such an argument seems an adequate
143
defense. The whistleblower’s alleged subjective intent was not to injure the
United States or aid a foreign government, but to inform the American public of
144
perceived government wrongdoing.
However, there is no explicit
whistleblower or “well-intentioned leaker” exception to the statute, so even
subjective intent to expose wrongdoing puts the whistleblower in a position to
145
have “reason to believe” that such a disclosure could harm national security.
Alternatively, if subjective intent is an appropriate defense, then a whistleblower
146
defense could be a guise for a more evil intent. A divulger need not be handled
or recruited by a foreign government and may seek to collect information in an
effort to aid a foreign government once he or she obtains something
147
presumptively useful. After all, there are established legal channels to disclose
employer misconduct, although not comprehensively, which prevent sensitive
148
information from reaching the hands of an adversary. Whether or not “good
faith” subjective intent is a valid defense to the “intent or reason to believe”
everything in between.”).
142. See e.g. MELISSA GOODWIN ET AL., AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, DISAVOWED: THE
GOVERNMENT’S UNCHECKED RETALIATION AGAINST NATIONAL SECURITY WHISTLEBLOWERS 4, 10 (2007),
available
at
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/safefree/disavowed_report.pdf
[hereinafter
DISAVOWED] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (highlighting that “whether a government employee
decides to speak out is intensely personal – but almost all national security whistleblowers decide to disclose
wrongdoing because they believe they have a patriotic duty to do so.”). Conversely, an argument can be made
that a whistleblower had specific intent to harm the U.S. government by exposing perceived government
wrongdoing to the public in order to elicit outrage and promote change. See generally Walter Pincus, A True
Whistleblower Doesn’t Behave Like Edward Snowden, WASH. POST (June 2, 2014), http://www.washington
post.com/world/national-security/a-true-whistleblower-doesnt-behave-like-edwardsnowden/2014/06/02/5e8484e0-e90c-11e3-afc6-a1dd9407abcf_story.html (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) (noting that “[a] real whistleblower would have selected the documents to be published, made certain
they didn’t harm security and remained in the country to face the consequences of his actions.”).
143. See generally Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 15, at 987–88 (describing that “[i]f ‘injury’ is
determined with reference to the actor’s subjective perceptions, defenses are plausible in three common
espionage situations. . . .”).
144. See Goitein, supra note 9 (describing the various levels reasons for disclosures of classified
information). However, it is important to note that in the case of Edward Snowden, his actions after the initial
disclosure to the media, including taking protected information to foreign countries, could very well be
considered aid to a foreign government. See infra Part III.D.1.
145. 18 U.S.C. §§ 793(a)–(b), 794(a) (2012).
146. See CHANGES IN ESPIONAGE, supra note 25, at 32, 70 (showing a differing in motives over time, but
not discussing any “whistleblowing” or “well-intentioned” motive when it comes to committing “espionage”).
147. Id.
148. See supra note 88 and accompanying text (regarding the various whistleblower protection statutes
and their shortcomings); see Goitein, supra note 9 ( “[T]he Whistleblower Protection Act . . . prohibits
government agencies from taking adverse ‘personnel actions’ against whistleblowers. However, the Act
excludes intelligence community employees, and it does not provide any whistleblower with a defense against
criminal prosecution.”); see also CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, supra note 81, at 1 (providing an overview of
the Whistleblower Protection Act).
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requirement, one thing is certain: the statute does not require the defendant to
149
have acted in “bad faith.”
Although section 794(b) requires intent, the reach of the statute is much
broader—the divulger need only “intent to communicate” protected information
150
without any contemplation of any injury or result. And under subsections
793(d)–(e), the scienter requirement is even more confusing because no showing
151
of specific intent is required.
When it comes to criminal intent under these subsections, prosecutors can
demonstrate actual intent by proving one of two states of mind: purpose or
152
153
knowledge. Purpose is the act or desire to bring about a result, while
154
knowledge is the awareness that a result follows from an action. Thus, one
interpretation of the requisite intent is that the divulger must reveal information
to another in some manner with the desire to injure the United States or with the
155
knowledge that such conduct is likely to injure the United States. Under such a
broad reading, the whistleblower who acquires such information, for example,
would clearly have intent or at the very minimum “reason to believe” that the
recipient could use the information to a foreign advantage or to injure the U.S.,
156
because he is likely aware that such a result would follow from its revelation.
The same may be true in the case of a media publisher who obtains defense
157
related information from a source. As scholars have concluded, “Congress
focused more on motive rather than result,” thus “intend[ing] to distinguish
revelation of defense information in espionage from the same revelation in public
158
debate, on the basis of the intent to inform the public.” Presumably, the Act
requires the same motive for the whistleblower who acquires defense information

149. See Statement of Vladeck, supra note 18, at 3 (“it is clear at the very least that nothing in the text of
the statute speaks to the defendant’s bad faith.”).
150. 18 U.S.C. § 794(b); see Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 15, at 945 (“794(b) is somewhat broader [than
794(a)] because the required culpability is only the mere intent that information be communicated. The actor’s
state of mind with respect to the injurious consequences of the communication is irrelevant.”).
151. The divulger only needs to “willfully communicate.”18 U.S.C. § 793(c)–(d); see infra Part III.A.2.b
(discussing “willfully”).
152. See Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 15, at 989 (discussing the differences between “conscious
purpose” and awareness).
153. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1431 (10th ed. 2014) (defining purpose as “[a]n objective, goal, or end,”
and defining purposeful as “[d]one with a specific purpose in mind; deliberate.”).
154. Id. at 1003 (defining knowledge as “[a]n awareness or understanding of a fact or circumstance; a
state of mind in which a person has no substantial doubt about the existence of a fact.”).
155. Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 15, at 986–87, 989.
156. See id. at 987
(“In most instances, however, people who make efforts to obtain defense-related information,
whether journalists or spies, do so because they envision the possibility of communicating it to
others. When the actor expects to tell others, the statute purports to make the acquisition
criminal-depending upon whether the intended or predictable consequences of revelation are
that the information will be used to injure the U.S. or to advantage any foreign nation.”).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 989.
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159

for public revelation. It seems then that under such circumstances, courts
160
should weigh motive greater than any resulting injury.
The courts have taken several different approaches when interpreting the
161
intent requirement, but the Supreme Court last defined it directly in Gorin v.
162
United States. In Gorin, the Court determined that disclosure of information in
163
violation of the Espionage Act must be made with “bad faith.” On the element
of intent, the Court determined that the government must show the divulger acted
164
in bad faith in order to find that he violated these subsections. The few courts
that later considered this issue have followed the Supreme Court’s interpretation
165
of intent in Gorin.
The troublesome implications of the “reason to believe” definition of
intent—knowledge that injury to the United States or aid to a foreign nation may
166
occur—extend quite far. Consider, again, a hypothetical whistleblower who has
obtained actual “national defense information” concerning what he believed to be
government misconduct. Even if he lacked specific intent to injure the United
States, and all other elements of the statute are met, he almost certainly had
reason to believe revelation could potentially injure the United States or aid a
foreign government. Thus, awareness of the possible consequences is seemingly
167
enough despite the fact that the divulger never specifically intended them.
What Congress meant by “intent” or “reason to believe” in the statute is as
168
unclear as the terms themselves. While the legislative debate over 794(b)

159. See generally DISAVOWED, supra note 142 and accompanying text.
160. See Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 15, at 989
(“Congress intended to distinguish revelation of defense information in espionage from the
same revelation in the public debate, on the basis of the intent to inform the public. If a
distinction under 793(a) and (b) is to be drawn between obtaining information for espionage
and for publication, it should turn on the culpability of the motive, not on a strained
construction of what ultimate consequences will ensue.”).
Presumably, the same could apply to a whistleblower. See generally id. (describing congressional attempts to
draw distinctions based on intent).
161. See e.g., Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239, 252 (1920) (giving little regard to the intent
requirement, and finding that giving the words any other interpretation “unduly restricts the natural meaning of
the clause, leaves little for it to operate upon, and disregards the context and the circumstances under which the
statute was passed.”).
162. Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19, 28 (1941).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. See e.g., United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602, 643 (E.D. Va. 2006) (finding that the
government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants disclosed classified information in bad
faith with actual intent to injure the United States); see supra notes 136–138 (discussing the facts of the case).
166. See Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 15, at 989, 997 (explaining that the term can be interpreted in at
least two different ways: awareness of consequences or subjective purpose).
167. See id. at 991 (“There are accordingly serious problems with a construction of the ‘reason to believe’
phrase that would be satisfied by an awareness of possible forbidden consequences, as opposed to a conscious
intent to bring them about.”).
168. Id.
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169

addressed the intent requirement in relation to other provisions later repealed,
the 793(a) and (b) record provides only two Congress Members’ direct
170
understanding of intent in the statute. Congressman Edwin Webb interpreted
171
intent to mean “a purpose to injure the United States,” and Congressman
George Graham interpreted intent as “a guilty purpose, to wit, to injure the
172
173
United States.” While Congress might have equated intent with purpose, it
174
gave little attention to the interpretation of “reason to believe.” Arguably, this
phrase is the most troublesome and controversial of these subsections’ scienter
175
elements. Courts could read this phrase so broadly that it encompasses any
176
cognizable consequence, or they might interpret it narrowly and fail to
adequately cover acts of espionage that, although not intended to injure or aid,
177
have always been penalized under the Act. In either case, courts will benefit
from more accurate and unambiguous definitions so that they can effectively
178
apply the statute’s culpability requirement to initial divulgers.
b. Willfully
Sections 793(d) and 793(e) do not require actual intent or reason to believe;
rather, the divulger need only “willfully communicat[e]” information relating to
179
the national defense to someone “not entitled to receive it.” While the
legislative history provides little insight into what it means to willfully
180
181
communicate, courts have construed the term in many ways. In United States
v. Morison, prosecutors charged Samuel Morison, a former United States
intelligence analyst, under sections 793(d) and 793(e) of the Espionage Act for
sending classified satellite images of Soviet naval operations to Jane’s Defence
182
183
Weekly. He was convicted on both counts in 1985. On the element of intent,
169. Id.
170. Id. at 995–96.
171. 55 CONG. REC. 1071, 1591 (1917).
172. Id. at 1717–18.
173. Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 15, at 996.
174. Id. at 991; 55 CONG. REC. 1591 (1917).
175. See Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 15, at 996 (discussing the effect to be given to the interpretation of
these subsections).
176. Id. at 991. For example, if a reporter intends to publish received classified information, he has reason
to believe it could be used to injure the U.S. or aid a foreign nation.
177. Id. at 997. For example, someone who sells classified information to advantage a foreign nation
purely to make money, completely indifferent to that result.
178. See Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 15, at 1076–77 (explaining that the “confusion about the
culpability standards” of the Espionage Act requires “clarification by legislation.”).
179. 18 U.S.C. 793(d)–(e) (2012).
180. Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 15, at 999.
181. See e.g., United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1071 (4th Cir.1988), United States v. Kiriakou,
898 F. Supp. 2d 921, 926 (E.D.Va. 2012) (interpreting the term “willfully”).
182. Morison, 844 F.2d at 1060–61.
183. James Risen, Clinton Did Not Consult C.I.A. Chief on Pardon, Official Says, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17,
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the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the District Court’s instruction that
“[a]n act is done willfully if it is done voluntarily and intentionally and with
specific intent to do something the law forbids. That is to say, with a bad purpose
184
either to disobey or to disregard the law.” Thus, the Government’s burden of
proof under sections 793(d) and (e) of the Act is to demonstrate that the divulger
185
made the disclosure with a “bad purpose” or in “bad faith.”
In 2012, John Kiriakou, a former Central Intelligence Agency analyst, was
convicted of espionage under section 793(d) for revealing a co-worker’s
classified name and information regarding the CIA’s use of waterboarding
186
interrogation techniques to the press. One of his defenses was that he did not
meet the necessary scienter element and could not be charged under the Act
187
because he had a good faith basis for disclosing the information. The court
ultimately rejected the contention and found that, under the statutory language,
the defendant’s “salutary motive” was irrelevant; the government did not need to
188
prove intent to injure as in 793(a) and (b). All the government needed to show
was that Kiriakou willfully communicated “information relating to the national
defense which . . . the possessor has reason to believe could be used to the injury
189
of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation.” Kiriakou
ultimately plead guilty to the charges, possibly because he was unable to show he
190
lacked the intent to harm the United States. Although the court did not
specifically define “willfully,” it seemed to infer that “willfully” did not mean
intentionally, at least not in the sense that Kiriakou needed any particular motive
191
to injure the United States.
192
The same was true for the conviction against Bradley Manning in 2012.
Manning, a former United States Army private, disclosed more than 91,000
193
194
military-related, classified documents to Wikileaks. In his prosecution, the
2001), www.nytimes.com/2001/02/17/us/clinton-did-not-consult-cia-chief-on-pardon-official-says.html (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review). Following his conviction, President Clinton pardoned Morison. Id.
184. Morison, 844 F.2d at 1071.
185. CRIMINAL PROHIBITIONS REPORT, supra note 16, at 16 n.99, 18.
186. Kiriakou, 898 F. Supp. 2d at 922; Scott Shane, Ex-Officer is First From C.I.A. to Face Prison for a
Leak, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2013), www.nytimes.com/2013/01/06/us/former-cia-officer-i-the-first-to-face-prisonfor-a-classified-leak.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
187. Kiriakou, 898 F.Supp.2d at 922.
188. Id. at 926–27.
189. 18 U.S.C. 793(d) (2013); Kiriakou, 898 F. Supp. 2d at 922.
190. See generally United States v. Kiriakou, No. 1:12cr127 (LMB), slip op. at 12 (E.D.Va. Oct. 16,
2012) (explaining why Kiriakou cannot raise a “good faith defense” to the charges under the Espionage Act).
191. See Kiriakou, 898 F. Supp. 2d at 923 (distinguishing the scienter requirements willfully and
intentionally).
192. CRIMINAL PROHIBITIONS REPORT, supra note 16, at 3; Associated Press, Manning Largely Barred
from Discussing WikiLeaks Harm, First Amendment Center (July 20, 2012), http://www.firstamendment
center.org/manning-largely-barred-from-discussing-wikileaks-harm (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
193. CRIMINAL PROHIBITIONS REPORT, supra note 16, at 2
194. Bradley Manning was prosecuted by a Military court martial. Julie Tate, Judge Sentences Bradley
Manning to 35 Years, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
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court found that his intent of allegedly informing the public of government
195
wrongdoing was inadmissible. Therefore, like Kiriakou, the court found the
scienter element “willfully” requires no specific intent, so the well-intentioned
196
defense was moot. Manning ultimately received a thirty-five year prison
197
sentence for violating section 793(e).
The legislative history is uncertain as to what Congress specifically meant by
“willfully,” and why Congress chose that term rather than “intent” as in the other
198
sections. But one logical conclusion is that whatever definition the legislature
meant to give to “willfully,” it is distinctly different from “intent or reason to
199
believe.” Scholars believe that “willfully” is a lower-threshold scienter
200
requirement and is easier for the government to prove than specific intent.
c. Injury of the United States or to the Advantage of Any Foreign
Nation
Under subsections 793(a)–(e) and 794(a), the divulger must have “intent or
reason to believe that the information is to be used to the injury of the United
201
States, or to the advantage of any foreign nation.” Critics of this language point
to the question of whether such a disclosure must actually injure the United
States or advantage a foreign government or if it is enough that the divulger
202
merely intended such a result. Indeed, many defendants in recent leak cases
have argued the theory that revealing classified information that results in no
harm to national security cannot constitute espionage within the meaning of the
203
Espionage Act. Looking at the specific language of the statute, the divulger
need only have the requisite intent to injure or advantage a foreign nation; such a

security/judge-to-sentence-bradley-manning-today/2013/08/20/85bee184-09d0-11e3-b87c476db8ac34cd_story.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). A military court martial prosecuted
Manning. Id.
195. Associated Press, Manning Largely Barred from Discussing WikiLeaks Harm, FIRST AMENDMENT
CENTER (July 20, 2012), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/manning-largely-barred-from-discussingwikileaks-harm (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
196. Id.; see supra note 191 and accompanying text.
197. Tate, supra note 194.
198. Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 15, at 1038–39.
199. Id. at 1039.
200. GOVERNMENT SECRECY, supra note 51, at 37; see Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 15, at 1039 (“The
Executive draftsmen of 793(d) and (e) clearly intended ‘willful” to require a minimum culpable intent. Their
concern was to close loopholes in the law, not impose stricter standards on the Government by requiring proof
of illicit ulterior purpose.”).
201. 18 U.S.C. §§ 793(a)–(e), 794(a) (2012).
202. See David Dishneau, Witness: No Harm to US from Leaked Gitmo Files, YAHOO NEWS, July 9,
2013, http://news.yahoo.com/witness-no-harm-us-leaked-gitmo-files-165619198.html (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (discussing Bradley Manning’s defense that he did not actually harm the U.S.).
203. See id. and accompanying text; see also United States v. Kim, Criminal No. 10-255 (CKK), slip op.
at 10 (D.D.C. May 30, 2013) (regarding the theory that there was no injury to the U.S., and thus, no crime under
the Espionage Act).
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204

result need not actually manifest. The fact that in some cases the leaked
information results in little or no injury to the nation has brought this issue to
205
light.
Courts have focused on “advantage” rather than “injury” because under
subsections requiring a scienter element, a defendant can more plausibly assert
206
that he or she did not intend any sort of injury to the U.S. Judicial interpretation
207
of the phrase “advantage to a foreign government” is a source of confusion.
First, the plain meaning of “advantage” is “helpful,” and given the nature of
intelligence activities by other countries, courts likely could deem any
208
information obtained by foreign countries as advantageous. Second, to “any
foreign nation” is likewise troublesome because the sensitivity or advantage of
209
the information changes depending on which country has the information. It
appears that the statute does not require a foreign nation’s advantage to be
adversarial in nature; in fact, other subsections specifically use the term “enemy”
210
and not “foreign nation,” drawing a distinction between the terms.
Recall that in Gorin, Salich provided United States counterintelligence
211
reports on Japanese activities to the U.S.S.R.’s agent. None of the reports
contained information regarding United States military operations, installations,
212
or preparedness as specifically proscribed in the Espionage Act. Regardless, the
213
information likely still related to the national defense, and presumably could
214
advantage a foreign nation.
In United States v. Morison, the Fourth Circuit determined that the
prosecution must “prove that the disclosure . . . would be potentially damaging to
215
the United States or might be useful to an enemy of the United States.” The

204. 18 U.S.C. §§ 793(a)–(e), 794(a).
205. See supra notes 203–204 and accompanying text.
206. See Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 15, at 987 (“Only the ‘advantage’ aspect of the standard has
received judicial elucidation.”).
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. See generally Epstein, supra note 13, at 513–14 (discussing how “foreign nation” should be changed
to “enemy” of the United States because “information disclosed to an enemy of the United States would
inherently qualify under the ‘could be used to the injury of the United States’ clause.”).
210. 18 U.S.C. §§ 793–794; see generally Epstein, supra note 13, at 514–15 (“Revision of the ‘to the
advantage of any foreign nation’ clause is necessary because the disclosure of information to the advantage of
key allies of the United States . . . could actually be beneficial in a time of war.”).
211. 312 U.S. 19, 22–23 (1941).
212. Id.
213. Discussed infra Part III.D.4.
214. Gorin, 312 U.S. at 29. The Court also stated,
“Nor do we think it necessary to prove that the information obtained was to be used to the
injury of the United States. The statute is explicit in phrasing the crime of espionage as an act
of obtaining information related to the national defense. . . . No distinction is made between
friend or enemy.”
Id. at 29–30.
215. 844 F.2d 1057, 1071 (1988).
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court declined to adopt the defendant’s argument that the national defense
information must cause “actual damage,” but still required the prosecution to
show the information could “potentially” harm the United States or be beneficial
216
to the enemy.
However, one court recently addressed whether a leaker could successfully
defend with the argument that no actual injury or advantage to a foreign nation
217
could result from the leak. In 2010, prosecutors charged Stephen Kim, a former
senior analyst for the United States Department of State, under the Act for
allegedly disclosing to a Fox News reporter that North Korea was planning to test
218
a nuclear bomb. A federal judge for the United States District Court of the
District of Columbia ruled that “the court declines to construe section 793(d) to
require the Government to show that the disclosure of the information at issue
would be potentially damaging to the United States or might be useful to an
enemy of the United States in order to satisfy the statutory requirement that the
219
information relate to the ‘national defense.’” Effectively, the judge decided that
220
the government need not address the injury at all. This decision goes against
the Morison court’s interpretation, further illustrating the inconsistency with
interpreting the troublesome language. Kim ultimately pled guilty to the
221
charges.
The language of the statute itself seems to suggest that a violation of the
Espionage Act turns on the divulger’s intent and not on the actual resulting
222
harm. However, whether the Act requires a divulger’s actions actually harm the
United States or provide an advantage to a foreign nation remains
223
controversial.
Even though the language of the statute is largely
straightforward, some critics of the Espionage Act argue that a leaker should only
224
be convicted if harm to the United States actually resulted from the disclosure.

216. Id. at 1072.
217. United States v. Kim, Criminal No. 10-255 (CKK), slip op. at 7, 10 (D.D.C. May 30, 2013).
218. Timothy M. Phelps, Former State Department Official Pleads Guilty in Leak to Fox News, LA
TIMES (Feb. 7, 2014), http://articles.latimes.com/2014/feb/07/nation/la-na-rosen-plea-20140208 (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
219. Memorandum Opinion, United States v. Kim, Criminal No. 10-255 (CKK) (D.D.C. May 30, 2013).
220. Id.
221. Phelps, supra note 218.
222. 18 U.S.C. 793(a)–(e), 794(a) (2012).
223. See e.g. United States v. Kim, Criminal No. 10-255 (CKK), slip op at 7 (D.D.C. May 30, 2013).
Associated Press, Manning Defense Rebuts Evidence Leaks Caused Harm, MILITARY.COM (July 9, 2013),
http://www.military.com/daily-news/2013/07/09/manning-defense-rebuts-evidence-leaks-caused-harm.html (on
file with the McGeorge Law Review) (discussing the Manning case and whether or not leaks resulted in harm to
the U.S.).
224. See supra note 204–205 and accompanying text.
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IV. A PROPOSAL TO CHANGE THE ESPIONAGE ACT
“I understood what I was doing and the decisions I made. However, I did
not truly appreciate the broader effects of my actions. . . . I am sorry for
the unintended consequences of my actions. When I made these
decisions, I believed I was [going to] help people, not hurt people.”
225
—Bradley Manning
Many of the inconsistencies in the Espionage Act jurisprudence stem from
the Act’s imprecise terminology, lack of clear definitions, and uncertain
226
legislative intent. As a result, defendants have challenged the Act as
227
228
unconstitutionally vague, grossly overbroad, and inconsistently interpreted. In
order to effectively prosecute cases of legitimate espionage and other criminal
conduct under its provisions, including divulgence of information that impacts
229
the nation’s security, revision is paramount.
A. Scope of Information Related to the National Defense
One solution to help effectively protect the national defense is to specify
230
what information really matters.
This requires narrowing and defining
231
particular categories of information that are critical to national security. The
breadth of the term “related to the national defense” creates a great deal of
uncertainty, and in fact, encompasses less truly sensitive information than it
232
would if properly defined.
Scholars have noted that adding the term “classified information” to define
the phrase, or replacing the phrase with “classified information,” would help
narrow the overly broad phrase “related to the national defense” and help remove
233
vagueness, primarily because properly classified information must only be
234
done so in protection of national security. Categorizing information as
225. Matt Sledge, Bradley Manning Takes Stand: ‘I Am Sorry . I Believed I Was Gonna Help People,’
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 14, 2014, 6:21 PM), www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/14/bradley-manningsorry_n_3757490.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (including the transcript of Bradley Manning’s
unsworn statement during his sentencing hearing on August 14, 2013).
226. See e.g. Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 15, at 1076 (arguing that “the basic espionage statutes are
totally inadequate. Even in their treatment of outright spying they are poorly conceived and clumsily drafted.”).
227. United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602 (E.D. Va. 2006).
228. See e.g. Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 15, at 1076–77 (explaining varying interpretations of the
statutory language).
229. See id. at 1079 (elucidating need for revision).
230. See id. at 1081 (explaining that important issues should not be “treat[ed] . . . so opaquely”).
231. See id. at 1085 (advocating for narrower application).
232. Id. (discussing the “vague parameters of ‘national defense information’”).
233. Patricia L. Bellia, Wikileaks and the Institutional Framework for National Security Disclosures, 121
YALE L.J. 1448, 1522 (2012).
234. See INFORMATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT OFFICE, MARKING CLASSIFIED NATIONAL SECURITY
INFORMATION 2 (rev. ed. 2014), available at http://www.archives.gov/isoo/training/marking-booklet.pdf
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classified generally distinguishes sensitive information critical to the national
235
defense, but it should not be dispositive. First, overclassification is a problem in
236
the United States,
and many documents that would have negligible
237
consequences to national security may nonetheless be improperly classified.
Second, not all critical national defense information is classified under the United
States classification system, but may consist of closely held information or even
238
observable acts. Thus, classified information should be a factor in determining
what information relates to the national defense, but should not be the only test.
Further, the statute should explicitly define “classified information” in order to
239
clarify what it encompasses.
The Act also protects information that may not be considered classified, but
240
remains sensitive or necessarily protected for purposes of national security.
Such information should also be explicitly defined in the statute, but narrower
than “related to the national defense.” Congress should add and define the term
241
“sensitive information” alongside “classified information.”
At the very minimum, Congress should remove the term “national defense”
242
because it is outdated. Since September 11, 2001 and the creation of the
[hereinafter MARKING CLASSIFIED] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (“Information shall not be
classified for any reason unrelated to the protection of national security.”).
235. GOVERNMENT SECRECY, supra note 51, at 27 n.4.
236. Bellia, supra note 233, at 1524 (noting that “not all unauthorized leaks are responses to
overclassification, [but] both the Pentagon Papers case and the WikiLeaks disclosures provide evidence of the
phenomenon”). Additionally, there is no defense for overclassification or “improper classification” when facing
criminal liability. Id. at 1523.
237. See MARKING CLASSIFIED, supra note 234, at 2 (“Information shall not be classified for any reason
unrelated to the protection of national security.”) See generally Bellia, supra note 233, at 1524 (explaining that
“[o]ne can sympathize with the claim that some of the material ought not to have been classified while still
having discomfort with this process of ‘declassification’ as well as the elimination of deference to the
executive’s judgment that disclosure would potentially cause harm.”).
238. Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 15, at 979–80. For example, observing how many vehicles leave a
military base can provide information on capability, strength, numbers of soldiers, etc. all of which could be
critical to the national defense. See id. at 979 (commenting “several small clues may permit piecing together the
entire story”). Another example is the aggregation of several pieces of unclassified information to deduce
sensitive or classified information. Id.
239. The Espionage Act already contains an explicit definition for “classified information” in subsection
798(b). 18 U.S.C. § 798 (2012). It is defined as “information which, at the time of a violation of this section, is
for reasons of national security, specifically designated by a United States Government Agency for limited or
restricted dissemination or distribution.” Id. Another statute specifically defines “classified information of the
United States” in a way that may be helpful to the reform of the Espionage Act as “information originated,
owned, or possessed by the United States Government concerning the national defense or foreign relations of
the United States that has been determined pursuant to law or Executive order to require protection against
unauthorized disclosure in the interests of national security.” Id. § 1924(c).
240. ALICE R. BUCHALTER ET. AL, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE
PROTECTION OF SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION 10 (2004), available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/
frd/pdf-files/sbu.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
241. One way of defining sensitive information may be “information in which the United States has
demonstratively taken steps to safeguard.”
242. See MARKING CLASSIFIED, supra note 234, at 2 (using the term “national security” as the
distinguishing characteristic for classifying information that needs safeguarding).

538

McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 46
Department of Homeland Security, the modern lexicon has been “homeland
243
security” or “national security.” There are very distinct differences between the
terms “national defense” and “national security”—one implies defending the
244
nation whereas the other implies securing or protecting the nation. Since
“national security” is the more defined and commonly used term, the broad term
“national defense” only complicates the modern understanding of the Espionage
Act.
Lastly, the Act references specific documents and types of information
throughout its subsections; for example, subsection 793(a) protects “information
245
concerning any vessel, aircraft,” etc. While some of these examples may
246
themselves be broad or even outdated, greater specificity will limit the scope of
sensitive information. Thus, Congress should reevaluate these specific areas of
information to determine whether they remain vital to national security.
B. Defining Existing Terms
If Congress wishes to keep the Espionage Act in its current form, then
defining confusing terms is essential to ensure appropriate prosecutions.
1. Intent Element
The “intent or reason to believe” element should be changed to “malicious
intent or actual knowledge.” While actual knowledge would seemingly always
apply to government employees with security clearance, like Snowden, who
undoubtedly know that disclosures of Top Secret information are likely to injure
247
the United States, such specific language makes absolutely clear that those who
have valid access to classified information have no excuse. They will, at a
minimum, have “actual knowledge” that such disclosure could “injure the United
States or aid a foreign government.” Such specificity will also ensure that those
248
who do not possess security clearances and secondary recipients like the media
243. See e.g., DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY, HOMELAND SECURITY INFORMATION NETWORK, http://www.
dhs.gov/homeland-security-information-network (last visited Nov. 1, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) (demonstrating that “homeland security” is not only an entire government department, but also a
widely understood term).
244. The former implies prevention; the latter implies reaction.
245. 18 U.S.C. §§ 793–794 (2012).
246. See e.g. 18 U.S.C. § 793(a) (specifying the term “camp” as a protected type of information—a term
that is very broad generally, yet extremely narrow in comparison to other military installations currently in
existence).
247. Persons who possess a valid federal security clearance and are indoctrinated for access to classified
information, and are required to sign a nondisclosure agreement setting forth the requirements of secrecy and
the penalties if they are not adhered to, fully informing the person of consequence of espionage. INFO. SEC.
OVERSIGHT OFFICE, CLASSIFIED INFORMATION NONDISCLOSURE AGREEMENT, STANDARD FORM NO. 312 (rev.
ed. 2013) (prescribed by 32 C.F.R § 2001.80 (2010).) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
248. Epstein, supra note 13, at 515 n.254 (citing Bruce Fein, Pelosi’s Chance to be Lady Liberty, Wash.
Times, Nov. 14, 2006, at A17).
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are not punished when they merely had some “reason to believe” the information
249
had potentially injurious effects to the United States. The Act imposes an
extremely harsh sentence on those who merely had “reason to believe” that their
250
disclosures would injure the United States or aid foreign governments. The Act
should not apply to them in the same way it would be applied to someone with
251
malicious intent or actual knowledge. Additional clarity could help deter
potential leakers who likely do not understand what the prosecution must prove
252
in order to convict a defendant of espionage; indeed, many likely have the
253
“traditional spy” notion in mind and may not identify themselves as such.
“Willfully” should be specifically defined and distinguished from “intent.” If
Congress wants courts to interpret willfully as a lesser standard of culpability
than intent, then Congress should define willfully as “consciously” or
254
“knowingly.” If Congress intends courts conflate willfully with intent, then
Congress should specify that willfully means purposeful (intent to bring about a
255
desired result).
2. Injury to the United States or Advantage of any Foreign Nation
Since “injury to the United States or advantage of any foreign nation” could
256
broadly cover any disclosure—even disclosures that cause little or no injury —
Congress should articulate or define these terms more accurately. Specifically,
257
Congress should replace “foreign nation” with “enemy of the United States,”
258
and then define enemy under applicable law. It makes little sense that an
individual would have reason to believe that helpful information provided to an
ally would consequently injure the United States, especially when such
259
disclosure may be in the interest of the United States. Thus, some information
may not injure the United States and, in fact, may even advantage the United
249. 18 U.S.C. § 793 (2012).
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. See generally Bellia, supra note 233, at 1522 (stating that “reform involves reassessing how the law
should deter and respond to leaks”).
253. See supra Part III.A. (discussing the different categorizations for divulging information).
254. Most courts that have addressed the issue have viewed the term “willfully” to mean less than intent,
so such an interpretation would be more consistent with case law. See supra Part III.B.2 (discussing the scienter
element of the Espionage Act). A proposed revision would be to specifically write into the Act: “For Purposes
of this Act, ‘willfully’ is defined as knowledge or awareness the result will follow.”
255. A proposed revision would be to specifically write into the Act: “For Purposes of this Act,
‘willfully’ is defined as intentionally, with purpose to bring about a desired result.”
256. See supra Part III.B.1.c. (regarding the problems with injury to the U.S.).
257. Epstein, supra note 13, at 513.
258. Id. (proposing that “enemy” should be defined as “anyone who could qualify as a lawful or unlawful
enemy combatant under the Military Commissions Act of 2006.”).
259. Id. at 514 (quoting Judge Learned Hand) (“[The Espionage Act] as enacted necessarily implies that
there are some kinds of information ‘relating to the national defense’ which must not be given to a friendly
power, not even to an ally, no matter how innocent, or even commendable, the purpose of the sender may be.”).

540

McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 46
260

States. However, courts would find it extremely difficult to assess such an
261
assertion. In addition, other information may be sensitive but not classified or
may be improperly classified because it does not relate to United States national
262
security or national defense. If it is unrelated to national security—the entire
purpose of the Espionage Act—then an individual could not have reason to
believe it would injure the United States. Consequently, the information must
actually touch on the national defense in order for the divulger to have reason to
263
believe that it could cause any injury.
C. Expanding the Nature of Disclosure
In addition to defining certain terms, Congress should re-write the statute to
encompass acts that currently do not constitute espionage. Take, for example,
264
media publication or whistleblowing revelation through proper channels. The
Act should provide a defense if a defendant can demonstrate that he or she made
the disclosure through proper whistleblowing reporting channels, which
consequently resulted in a public disclosure. Clearly, this defense would not
cover Snowden-style straight-to-press disclosures, but such a defense may
encourage future whistleblowers to report through the proper channels. If a wellintentioned whistleblower seeks to reveal government wrongdoing, then allowing
the appropriate avenues and a suitable defense may help limit the exposure of
information that could have damaging effects to national security or advantage an
adversary and facilitate transparency.
V. CONCLUSION
The Espionage Act needs revision to remove confusion and create a more
consistent application of the law. In order to effectively prosecute legitimate
cases of espionage, courts and prosecutors must clearly understand what
constitutes espionage. Overly broad and ambiguous terminology has resulted in
265
confusion, misapplication of the statute, and constitutional challenges. If
Congress truly desires an Act that protects our national security, it must
260. See id. and accompanying text.
261. See id. at 514–515 (discussing advantages of disclosures to the United States’ allies during war).
262. See Bellia, supra note 233 (noting that “not all unauthorized leaks are responses to
overclassification, [but] both the Pentagon Papers case and the WikiLeaks disclosures provide evidence of the
phenomenon”); MARKING CLASSIFIED, supra note 234, at 2 (“Information shall not be classified for any reason
unrelated to the protection of national security.”); note 236 and accompanying text.
263. See supra section IV.B (providing suggestions to revision of the scope of information related to the
national defense).
264. See, e.g., Intelligence Cmty. Whistleblower Prot. Act of 1998, H.R.B. 3694, 105th Cong. §§ 702–03
(1998) (enacted). This Act “protects intelligence community whistleblowers who follow detailed procedures for
disclosing matters of ‘urgent concern,’ a category that includes evidence of flagrant law breaking and lying to
Congress.” Bellia, supra note 233 at 1525.
265. See supra notes 226–228 and accompanying text.
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adequately encompass modern developments, such as technology and the
classification system, to refine the antiquated law. Our espionage laws should
comport with modern reality. Application of the statute in charging
whistleblowers, leakers, and potentially others will only prove more challenging
as the country develops new technologies. Congress must suitably address the
issues the Act has raised.
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